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Abstract
Electric vehicle charging facilities offer electric charge and parking to users for a fee. Both parking availability and electric
charge capacity are constrained resources, and as the demand for charging facilities grows with increasing electric vehicle
adoption, so too does the potential for exceeding these resource limitations. In this paper, we study how prices set by the
charging facility impact the likelihood that resource constraints are exceeded. Specifically, we present probabilistic bounds
on the number of charging spots and the total power supply needed at a facility based on the characteristics of the arriving
vehicles. We assume the charging facility either offers a set of distinct and fixed charging rates to each user or allows the user
to decide a charging deadline, from which a charging rate is determined. Users arrive randomly, requiring a random amount
of charge. Additionally, each user has a random impatience factor that quantifies their value of time, and a random desired
time to stay at a particular location. Assuming rational user behavior, and with knowledge of the probability distribution
of the random parameters, we present high-confidence bounds on the total number of vehicles parked at the station and the
aggregate power use of all vehicles actively charging. We demonstrate how these bounds can be used by a charging facility to
determine appropriate prices and investigate through a Monte-Carlo simulation case study the tightness of the bounds.
1 Introduction
The electric vehicle (EV) revolution promises to trans-
form transportation and mobility. This has been cat-
alyzed by improved affordability of electric vehicles
(EVs) such that [9] predicts that by 2040 the global
new vehicle sales will be comprised of 58% EVs and
the global passenger vehicle market will be 31% elec-
tric. With the growing numbers of electric vehicles, the
demands on charging facilities will be greater.
The EV charging problem can be classified into the fol-
lowing categories: EV usage in the context of smart
grid or vehicle-to-grid, EV charging network design, EV
charging facility pricing, and EV routing [15],[1]. Note
that while these classifications are useful, there exists
literature which addresses more than one of these cate-
gories at once. Furthermore, the EV charging problem
has been addressed within game-theoretic, optimization,
and control system frameworks while adhering to capac-
ity constraints, e.g., in [12], [17], [18]. For example, in [7],
charging management is performed by solving a social
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Atlanta, GA, 30318, USA. {csantoyo, gustav.nilsson,
sam.coogan}@gatech.edu. This work was partially sup-
ported by NSF under Grant #1931980. C. Santoyo was sup-
ported by the NSF Graduate Research Fellowship Program
under Grant No. DGE-1650044.
2 A preliminary version of this paper was in part published
in the proceedings of the IFAC World Congress 2020 [14].
welfare nonlinear optimization problem subject to power
constraints. Here, the distribution locational marginal
pricing provides an effective way for mitigating charg-
ing facility congestion. In [4], scheduling electric vehi-
cle charging is formulated as an optimal control prob-
lem which algorithmically converges to optimal charg-
ing profiles which are cognizant of power constraints.
The paper [2] considers a spatiotemporal model for rapid
charging facilities. There, the authors propose a queuing
theoretic model which predicts the demand on charg-
ing facilities using the fluid traffic model such that the
arrival rate of users is not known a priori. In [10], the
authors study the problem of optimal pricing and rout-
ing schemes for a charging network operator where users
specify their priority level while the charging network
operator chooses between a profit-maximizing and a so-
cial welfare-maximizing mode. The paper [6] studies the
problem of optimally charging EVs by distributing the
optimization program to ultimately compute the conges-
tion impact of a population of vehicles on the power net-
work. In this paper, we focus on the EV charging facility
pricing problem, i.e., how the choice of different pricing
models affects the risk of exceeding resource capacity.
In practice, the dual purpose of EV charging facilities
as both a parking location and a place to charge your
vehicle will often compete against one another. From a
user perspective, it is essential to have access to avail-
able charging stations, especially since many EVs have
limited range. From a charging facility operator perspec-
tive, it is imperative to provide satisfactory service to
users. Apart from accommodating the users, the opera-
tors may have to ensure that their total power consump-
tion stays below a certain level to avoid overloading the
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power grid. Some operators have to properly manage
the dual function of charging facilities serving as park-
ing locations, with mindful considerations for space con-
straints and price sensitivities of users.
In this paper, we model the user-charging facility dy-
namics in a queuing framework where a user arrives with
parameters which are random variables. These variables
are the users’ energy demand, impatience factor which
quantifies how a user values their time, and their de-
sired time at a location. The charging facility is able to
charge vehicles for a fee at variable rates, and we consider
two possible modes of operation: a service level model
in which a user chooses from a discrete set of charging
rates, and a deadline model in which a user chooses a
charging deadline. In either model, the fee, i.e., price,
set by the charging facility depends on the user’s choice,
and a user chooses a particular service level or charging
deadline which minimizes a total cost that is a combi-
nation of the actual cost to charge the vehicle and park
at the facility and the user’s opportunity cost from the
time it takes to receive the charge. This cost is there-
fore a function of the user’s random parameters and the
prices set by the charging facility.
The contributions of this paper are the following. First,
we formalize the charging facility model and the two
operating models described above. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first model of EV charging facilities
that explicitly includes variable pricing for varying lev-
els of service, parking costs, and user opportunity costs.
This model provides a tractable approach for studying
EV charging under diverse constraints and user assump-
tions. Furthermore, using knowledge on the probability
distribution of the user parameters, we derive confidence
intervals on a charging facility’s likelihood of not ex-
ceeding a specified number of users (i.e., occupied charg-
ing spots) and/or a specified threshold of electric power
draw. Lastly, we study the practicality of the two oper-
ating models considered by demonstrating how a charg-
ing facility operator utilizes our results to set the pricing
function parameters for both operating models.
This paper extends the prior works [13,14]. In particu-
lar, we expand [13], which only considers the deadline
model in which a user chooses a charging deadline, by
considering a more general class of pricing functions, and
including a cost to the user if a user desires to stay at a
charging facility beyond their time to fully charge their
vehicle. We expand [14], which only considers the ser-
vice level model in which a user chooses from a discrete
set of charging rates, by including a parking fee.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 formally introduces relevant parameters and
formulates the problem statement for the discrete and
continuous pricing models, Section 3 presents the main
results of this paper, i.e., probabilistic bounds on the
number of users and the total power consumption for
the different pricing models. Section 4 presents a case
study which compares the theoretical to simulated re-
sults along with an example on how a charging facil-
ity operator can adjust the pricing parameters to stay
within resource limits, and Section 5 concludes the pa-
per. The Appendix contains proofs of some of the re-
sults presented in the paper along with some additional
propositions used in the paper.
1.1 Notation
We denote the positive part of a real number x by [x]+ =
max(0, x). For an indexed set of variables {xk}, we let
∆ijx denote the difference between the variable with in-
dex i and j, i.e., ∆ijx = x
i − xj .
When considering a collection of independent and iden-
tically distributed (i.i.d) random variables indexed by
subscripts, we use non-subscript variables when refer-
ring to properties that hold for any of the i.i.d random
variables. For example, E[x] is the expectation of each
i.i.d random variable xj .
2 EV Charging Facility Model Formulation
Consider an EV charging facility that serves a local at-
traction or public facility, e.g., highway rest area, a shop-
ping center, business park, hotel, or government build-
ing, and which has a finite number of parking spots which
serve as parking and charging locations for individual
vehicles. The charging facility therefore provides both
electric energy to vehicles as well as parking.
We study the problem of how the EV charging facility
should set prices for charging and parking to balance its
supply of these resources with the demand of users. In
particular, we consider two fundamental operating mod-
els: in the first model, called the defined service level
model (DSL), users directly choose from a discrete set
of charging rates. In the second model, called the pre-
scribed deadline model (PD), users indirectly choose a
charging rate by specifying a departure time. In the DSL
model, we assume the charging facility is able to provide
electric energy at several discrete rates of charge for dif-
fering prices. This flexibility allows the charging facility
to manage both the total power usage and, indirectly,
the charging facility usage. In the PD model, rather than
directly choose a charging rate, users choose a deadline
and the charging facility is assumed to provide energy
at a constant rate so that the vehicle is fully charged by
the deadline. In both models, a user’s choice is deter-
mined by the amount of charge required for their EV,
the preferred amount of time they will spend at the lo-
cal attraction, the prices set by the charging facility, and
their impatience factor. We now make this setup and the
accompanying assumptions precise.
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Table 1
User Parameter Definitions
Var. Parameter Unit Range
j user index - -
aj arrival time hr. -
xj user demand kWh [xmin, xmax]
αj impatience factor $/hr. [αmin, αmax]
ξj desired time at location $/hr. [ξmin, ξmax]
rj charging rate kW (0, R
max]
uj prescribed deadline hr [umin, umax]
At this facility, a user j arrives at some time aj (in hr.)
with charging demand xj (in kWh), an impatience fac-
tor αj (in $/hr.), and a desired (i.e., minimum) amount
of time they will spend at the charging location ξj (hr.).
The impatience factor quantifies how much a user values
their time versus money, i.e., it is the opportunity cost
for the user to wait to charge their vehicle. Throughout
the paper we will make the following assumption about
the aforementioned variables.
Assumption 1 (Users) User arrivals at the charg-
ing facility are a Poisson process with parameter λ
(in EVs/hr.). Individual charging demand xj, the im-
patience factor αj, and the time spent at the charg-
ing location ξj for each user j are random variables
which are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d).
Additionally, there exists finite 0 < xmin < xmax,
0 ≤ αmin < αmax, and 0 ≤ ξmin < ξmax such that the
distributions of xj, αj, and ξj are only supported on
[xmin, xmax], [αmin, αmax], and [ξmin, ξmax], respectively.
Furthermore, each xj and αj are assumed to be contin-
uous random variables but we allow for the possibility
that ξmin = 0 and P(ξj = 0) > 0 to accommodate the
practical special case in which, with nonzero probability,
users have no desire to remain at the charging facility.
In this case, the distribution of ξj is understood to be a
generalized probability density function.
The user parameters, their respective units, and upper
and lower bounds are summarized in Table 1. As men-
tioned previously, we consider two models for how a user
pays for charging their vehicle. In both models, users
balance the need for electric charge with the need for a
parking spot for at least their desired time at the local
attraction, which may be zero. In the DSL model, a user
chooses from a discrete number, possibly just one, of pos-
sible charging levels. Thus, a user can charge their vehicle
faster by paying more for a higher rate of charge. In the
DSL model, a user might also pay a parking fee if their
vehicle reaches full charge before the user’s desired time
at the attraction, ξj . In the PD model, the user directly
provides a departure time, i.e., a charging deadline, and
the charging facility provides electric power during the
resulting time window so that the vehicle has full charge
at departure. In both models, a user will always remain
Table 2
Parameter Definitions for the Charging Facility under the
DSL Model
Var. Parameter Unit Range
` service level - {1, . . . , L}
V ` price per unit of energy $/kWh -
R` charging rate kW (0, Rmax]
F parking fee $/hr. -
at the charging facility at least for the desired time ξj ,
but they may stay longer if the charging facility offers
sufficient discount for providing a slower charging rate.
We formalize these two models in the next two subsec-
tions.
2.1 Defined Service Level (DSL) Model
In the DSL model, the charging facility offers L service
levels. Each service level ` ∈ {1, . . . , L} corresponds to a
distinct charging rate R` > 0 (in kW) and price V ` > 0
(in $/kW) that is the cost per unit energy for the service
level. Thus, user j with energy demand xj pays xjV
` (in
$) to receive a full charge over the time horizon xj/R
`
(in hr.) when choosing service level `. Additionally, the
users face a parking fee F (in $/hr.) which is equal across
all service levels. The parameters related to the charging
facility under a discrete pricing model are listed in Ta-
ble 2. To distinguish the parameters related to the charg-
ing facility from those related to the users, the charging
facility parameters are upper case and indexed by a su-
perscript, while the parameters for the users are lower
case and indexed by a subscript.
Assumption 2 (DSL Model Charging Rates)
Among L service levels offered by the charging facility, a
higher charging rate is more costly, i.e., if Ri > Rk then
V i > V k. Moreover, charging rates and prices are dis-
tinct so that Ri 6= Rk for all i 6= k. Lastly, and without
loss of generality, the charging facility’s pricing func-
tions are enumerated such that V 1 < V 2 < . . . < V L and
therefore R1 < R2 < . . . < RL. Define the maximum
charging rate Rmax := RL.
A user j will remain at a charging facility for the amount
of time to completely fulfill their demand xj and for
their desired time at the local attraction, ξj , whichever
is larger. Since user j values their time in excess of the
time they want to spend at the charging facility at a rate
αj , they may be willing to pay for a higher service level
since it delivers a full charge faster. On the contrary, a
charging facility operates under space constraints so a
charging facility operator will impose a parking fee at a
rate F which penalizes a user for the time they spend in
excess of receiving a full charge. To this end, the total
cost faced by a user arriving at the charging facility with
impatience factor αj , desired time spent at the charging
location ξj , and charging demand xj , and who chooses
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service level `, is given by
g`(xj , αj , ξj) =
xjV
` + αj
[ xj
R`
− ξj
]
+
+ F
[
ξj − xj
R`
]
+
. (1)
In (1), the first term of the sum, xjV
`, is the energy
cost to the user resulting from their demand at ar-
rival. The second term of (1), αj
[ xj
R`
− ξj
]
+
, where
xj
R`
is the time to charge for a particular service level `,
is the cost associated with how much a user values
their time in excess of the time they sought to spend
at the charging facility location. Lastly, the third
term in (1), F
[
ξj − xjR`
]
+
, is the parking cost associ-
ated with spending more time at a charging facility
than the time to fulfill the user’s demand xj . Individ-
ual users choose a service level at a charging facility
which minimizes their total cost of charging factor-
ing in their impatience. To that end, let S(xj , αj , ξj) :
[xmin, xmax] × [αmin, αmax] × [ξmin, ξmax] → {1, . . . , L}
be defined by
S(xj , αj , ξj) = arg min
`∈{1,...,L}
g`(xj , αj , ξj) . (2)
Then, a rational user j chooses service level S(xj , αj , ξj)
in order to minimize their total cost as formalized in the
later stated assumption.
For notational convenience, we also define the values rj
to be the charging rate and cost per unit of energy cho-
sen by user j after solving (2), i.e., rj = R
S(xj ,αj ,ξj),
as indicated in Table 1. Observe that the user charg-
ing times xj/rj , being uniquely determined by xj , αj ,
and ξj , constitute a collection of independent and iden-
tically distributed random variables. Furthermore, this
means the time a user spends at the charging location
is max {ξj , xj/rj} where xj/rj is the time for a user to
receive a full charge based on their chosen service level.
Assumption 3 (DSL Users are Rational) Each
user chooses a charging rate according to (2) and leaves
the charging facility once they have satisfied their charg-
ing demand or when their desired time at a charging
facility has been reached, whichever is greater. Thus,
user j occupies a charger at the facility during the time
interval [aj , aj + max {ξj , xj/rj}].
A practically important special case of (1) occurs when
there is no local attraction beyond the charging facility
so that users only wish to charge their vehicle, i.e., ξj =
0 for all j and the charging facility does not serve a
secondary purpose of providing parking, and thus we
may take F = 0. In this special case, (1) becomes
g`(xj , αj) = xjV
` + αj
xj
R`
. (3)
We refer to this special case as the DSL free parking
model (DSL-FP model). If we refer to the DSL model in
an instance which excludes the DSL-FP special case, we
sometimes refer to it as the DSL metered parking model
(DSL-MP model) for emphasis.
Note that the DSL-FP model is the focus of our prior
work [14]; hence, the cost function (1) is a generalization
of that considered in [14] which accounts for parking fees
and users staying at a particular location longer than
their time-to-charge. In the DSL-FP model, as in the
DSL-MP model, given a collection of pricing functions as
in (3), a user j chooses their service level by solving (2),
but we omit ξj as an argument in the corresponding
expressions.
As described above, the DSL model allows for a charg-
ing facility that offers multiple discrete charging levels.
For example, this model is well-suited for existing charg-
ing infrastructure, which is currently divided into three
charging levels [11].
However, it may be more convenient for the user to
provide a deadline by which they expect to receive a
full charge, and for the charging facility to determine a
price and charge rate to fulfill this deadline. Such pricing
schemes have indeed been implemented in practice [5].
In other words, it may be the case that the users are
not restricted to a predefined set of service levels, but
rather can pick any charging rate by proxy of choosing
a charging deadline. This setting is characterized in the
following subsection.
2.2 Prescribed Deadline (PD) Model
In this section, we construct the PD model for the EV
charging facility and utilize the variable definitions pre-
sented in Table 1.
As in the DSL model, in the PD model a user j arrives
with charging demand xj , a desired time at the loca-
tion ξj , and an impatience factor αj . However, in the
PD model, the user j chooses a charging deadline uj
rather than a discrete charging rate. The charging fa-
cility broadcasts a single pricing function P (xj , uj) that
constitutes the financial cost to a user receiving charge xj
over the deadline uj . Then,
C(xj , uj , αj , ξj) = P (xj , uj) + αj(uj − ξj) (4)
is the total cost faced by a user j who arrives with de-
mand xj , impatience factor αj , planned time at loca-
tion ξj , and who chooses a charging deadline uj ≥ ξj .
Hence, (4), penalizes users more for choosing a charg-
ing deadline uj greater than their desired time at a lo-
cation ξj at a rate αj . A rational user j chooses their
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charging deadline according to
uj ∈ arg min
u≥ξj
C(xj , u, αj , ξj) . (5)
In (4), we see that in addition to paying a price to charge
as a function of the demand and chosen deadline, a user
faces an opportunity cost which is a function of their
impatience and how much time beyond their desired
time, ξj , they spend at the charging facility.
Assumption 4 (PD Users are Rational) Each user
chooses a charging deadline according to (5) and leaves
the charging facility at the chosen deadline. Thus, user j
occupies a charger at the facility during the time interval
[aj , aj + uj ].
We explore the problem of charging facilities within the
context of limited resources; therefore, there are physical
limitations on the charging facilities such as a maximum
charging rate allowable per user. This point is formalized
in the following assumption.
Assumption 5 (PD Model Charging Rates) The
pricing function P (xj , uj) is such that there exists an
upper bound Rmax on the charging rate for any user
solving (5) under the PD model, i.e., Rmax ≥ rj , where
rj = xj/uj, for all users j when uj is chosen according
to (5). Moreover, the charging facility provides electric
power at the constant rate rj over the charging time
horizon uj for each user j.
Remark 1 In the PD model, note that the charg-
ing deadline uj, and therefore also the charging rate
rj = xj/uj, is a continuous random variable. This con-
trasts with the DSL model where rj is a discrete random
variable.
There exist many candidate functions that can be uti-
lized as pricing functions. Analysis of the minimizer
in (5) is particularly amenable in the case that the
pricing function P (xj , uj) is convex in the deadline vari-
able uj . In that case, C(xj , uj , ξj) is also convex in uj ,
and hence there exists a unique minimizer u∗ for (5).
The following is an example of such a pricing function.
Example 1 Consider the pricing function
P (xj , uj) = xj
(
D(uj − ω)2 +B
)
, (6)
where D is the surge price (in $/kWh-hr.2), ω is the
charging facility’s desired time spent at the charger (in
hr.), and B is the base price (in $/kWh).Then, from (5),
a user j chooses deadline
uj ∈ arg min
u≥ξj
xj
(
D(u− ω)2 +B)+ αj(u− ξj) .
Note that the term (uj − ω)2 allows the charging facility
to penalize a user for choosing a deadline less than or
greater than ω at a surge price rate D. The surge price
penalty is in addition to the base price B that a user pays
for their charging demand.
Since (4) substituted with (6) is convex in u, the mini-
mizer is unique and available in closed-form so that user
j will choose deadline
uj := u
∗ = max
{
ξj ,
−αj
2Dxj
+ ω
}
. (7)
As previously mentioned, we operate under Assump-
tion 5, i.e., Rmax ≥ xj/uj must hold. Interpreting Rmax
as an a priori fixed limit, the charging facility must then
choose parameters D, B, and ω to satisfy Assumption
5. Algebraic manipulations combined with reasoning
when the maximum is attained lead to the fact that
ω > xmax/R
max and
D >
[
max
xj∈[xmin,xmax]
αminR
max
2ωxjRmax − 2x2j
]
+
. (8)
In practice, (8) provides a way for charging facilities to
set the surge price D so that the charging rate limit Rmax
for each user is satisfied.
Remark 2 In the DSL model the user will remain at the
charging location for max{ξj , xj/rj}. This means that
there exists the possibility that the user selects a charging
rate which fulfills the vehicles charging demand before the
user has reached their desired time to spend at the loca-
tion ξj. However, in the PD case, a user selects a deadline
uj and the appropriate rate is set that fulfills the charg-
ing demand exactly at the deadline time. This means that
in the PD model the vehicle will finalize charging exactly
when the users leaves.
Remark 2 points to a subtle distinction that is impor-
tant because we are interested in providing probabilistic
bounds on the number of present users at the charging
facility. Hence, in the DSL model, there is a difference in
the number of users actively charging and the number
of users present at the charging facility.
Next, we formally introduce the problem statement for
the charging facility which lays the foundation for the
main result for both the DSL and PD models and which
captures the subtle distinction in Remark 2.
2.3 Guarantees on Charging Facility Capacity Limits
Charging facilities are concerned with adhering to both
user capacity and energy consumption restrictions. Let
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the set of present users at the charging facility at time t
be defined as
N(t) =
{
{i : t ∈ [ai, ai + max{ξi, xiri }]} if DSL
{i : t ∈ [ai, ai + ui]} if PD
and let η(t) = |N(t)| be the cardinality of the set of
present users. Moreover, let the set of actively charging
users be
Nact(t) =
{
{i : t ∈ [ai, ai + xiri ]} if DSL
{i : t ∈ [ai, ai + ui]} if PD
and let ηact(t) = |Nact(t)| be the cardinality of the set
of actively charging users. Then,
Q(t) =
∑
i∈Nact(t)
ri
is the total charging rate at time t for all actively charg-
ing users, i.e., the charging facility’s total power con-
sumption. Note that ri = xi/ui in the summation for
the PD model.
We consider the problem in which the charging facil-
ity is interested in providing probabilistic guarantees on
the number of present users in the system and the total
power requirements at any given time t. We thus wish
to compute a high-confidence bound on the total num-
ber of active users and their respective aggregate power
draw at any given time, as is made precise in the follow-
ing problem statement.
Problem Statement 1 Given an EV charging facility
operating under the DSL (resp., PD) model satisfying
Assumption 2 and 3 (resp., Assumption 4 and 5) and
EV users satisfying Assumption 1, for any M number
of users andR total charging facility power consumption
rate, compute δ(M) and γ(R) such that
P(η(t) <M) ≥ 1− δ(M) (9)
and
P(Q(t) < R) ≥ 1− γ(R) . (10)
3 Main Results
In this section, we first introduce several propositions
which formalize the probability that a randomly selected
user will choose a particular service level in the DSL
model. These results elucidate the remarkable fact that,
conditioned on the ratio xj/ξj , the probability of choos-
ing a particular rate in the DSL model depends only on
the impatience factor αj . We formalize the results for
the DSL model in the following subsection. We do not
present similar results for the PD model since many of
the distributions of interest in the PD model are derived
distributions resulting from algebraic operations on ran-
dom variables and thus, in general, do not have closed
form expressions. Lastly, we present a theorem which
solves the problem statement above and provides proba-
bilistic guarantees of the form (9)–(10) for both the DSL
and PD model.
3.1 User Choice under DSL Model
Define the ratio
ρj = xj/ξj .
In the case that ξj = 0, which by Assumption 1 may
occur with nonzero probability, we take ρj = ∞ and
the following analysis still holds. When analyzing the
pricing function in (1), it becomes apparent that a user j
selecting service level ` pays either a cost associated with
their opportunity cost (i.e., impatience) when xj/R
` >
ξj (equivalently, ρj > R
`) or a cost associated with the
parking fee when xj/R
` < ξj (equivalently, ρj < R
`).
Note that ρj (in kW) is the charging rate that would
deliver full charge to user j over their desired time at
location ξj .
The random variable ρj has domain [ρmin, ρmax] with
ρmin = xmin/ξmax and ρmax = xmax/ξmin with possibly
ρmax =∞. Moreover, since ρj is user j’s desired charge
rate, we partition its domain based on the L service
levels. In particular, we obtain the partition intervals
ρj < R
1, ρj ∈
[
Rm, Rm+1
)
for all m ∈ {1, . . . , L − 1},
and RL ≤ ρj . This is illustrated in Fig. 1. As a result of
this observation, we can find the probability that a par-
ticular service level will be the minimizing service level
while conditioning on ρj and evaluating the conditional
probability at each of the aforementioned intervals.
We formalize these observations in Proposition 1 which
defines the probability the DSL pricing functions of the
form of (1) will be the minimum within the set of service
levels and hence will be the choice of a particular user.
For the remainder of the paper we let R¯` = 1/R` for all
` ∈ {1, . . . , L}. Additionally, fP(ρ) is the distribution
of ρj supported on [ρmin, ρmax] and note that EP [z(ρ)] =∫∞
−∞ z(φ)fP(φ) dφ for some function z(ρ).
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, con-
sider the set of L functions of three independent RVs{
g`(xj , αj , ξj)
}L
`=1
where each g` is of the DSL model as
defined in (1) and selection function S(xj , αj , ξj) as de-
fined in (2). Then, for k ∈ {1, . . . , L},
P(S(xj , αj , ξj) = k) = EP
[
P
(
gk = min
i
gi | ρj
)]
,
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Fig. 1. The figure shows the probability that a user j with
desired charging rate ρj = xj/ξj chooses service level k.
Depending upon the users impatience factor, a user may
choose a lower charging level than the partition boundaries
of where the desired charging rate ρj lies.
where
P
(
gk = min
i
gi | ρj
)
=
1 if ρj < R
1 ∧ k = 1
0 if ρj < R
1 ∧ k > 1
P
(
¯
αk1 < αj < α¯
k
1
)
if ρj ∈ [Rm, Rm+1) ∧ k ≤ m
P
(
¯
αk2 < αj < αmax
)
if ρj ∈ [Rm, Rm+1) ∧ k = m+ 1
0 if ρj ∈ [Rm, Rm+1) ∧ k > m+ 1
P
(
¯
αk3 < αj < α¯
k
3
)
if ρj ≥ RL
and
α¯k1 =
min
αmax,min
m<i
F
(
1
ρj
− 1Ri
)
−∆ki V
1
Rk
− 1ρj
, min
k<i≤m
∆ikV
∆ki R¯
 ,
¯
αk1 = max
(
αmin, max
i<k≤m
∆ikV
∆ki R¯
)
,
¯
αk2 = max
αmin, max
i<m+1
F
(
1
Rk
− 1ρj
)
−∆ki V
1
ρj
− 1Ri
 ,
α¯k3 = min
(
αmax, min
k<i
∆ikV
∆ki R¯
)
,
¯
αk3 = max
(
αmin, max
i<k
∆ikV
∆ki R¯
)
.
Furthermore, the charging rates rj chosen by each user j
is a collection of independent and identically distributed
discrete random variables each with probability mass
function (PMF)
pr(r) =

EP [P (g1 = mini gi | ρj)] if r = R1 ,
...
EP [P (gL = mini gi | ρj)] if r = RL .
Proposition 1 states that the probabilities of a service
level being the minimizing choice for a user is computable
by leveraging the law of total probability. While in some
intervals, the probability P (gk = mini gi | ρj) is either 0
or 1, in others it is an integration over an interval of the
distribution of the impatience factor where there exists
a possibility that P (gk = mini gi | ρj) is zero within a
particular partition. Lastly, Proposition 1 formalizes the
fact that choosing a service level amounts to choosing a
particular charging rate and presents the resulting PMF
for the charging rates rj . The proof of Proposition 1 is
in Appendix A.1.
Fig. 1 illustrates P (gk = mini gi | ρj) when L = 4 ser-
vice levels. Considering the case when ρj < R
1, we
see that P (g1 = mini gi | ρj) = 1 which follows the
first case statement for P (gk = mini gi | ρj) in Propo-
sition 1. Analyzing the case when ρj ∈ [R1, R2),
we see that P (g1 = mini gi | ρj) decreases while
P (g2 = mini gi | ρj) increases for increasing ρj . Lastly,
considering the case when ρj ∈ [R2, R3), we see that
P (g1 = mini gi | ρj) is constant, P (g2 = mini gi | ρj)
decreases, and P (g3 = mini gi | ρj) increases for in-
creasing ρj . Note however that while ρj ∈ [R2, R3), it
may still be optimal for a user to choose level R1. This
results from the impatience factor with which a user
arrives. Specifically, if a users impatience factor is low
enough they may opt to choose a slower charging rate
since the parking fee may result in a higher cost. Note
that the same phenomenon occurs when ρj ∈ [R3, R4)
and extends for any L service levels.
In the DSL-FP special case described by the total cost
function (3), Proposition 1 becomes the following corol-
lary.
Corollary 2 Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, con-
sider the set of L functions of two independent RVs{
g`(xj , αj)
}L
`=1
where each g` is of the DSL-FP model
as defined in (3). Then, for k ∈ {1, . . . , L},
P
(
S(xj , αj) = k
)
= P
(
¯
αk < αj < α¯
k
)
where
α¯k = min
(
αmax, min
k<i
∆ikV
∆ki R¯
)
,
¯
αk = max
(
αmin, max
i<k
∆ikV
∆ki R¯
)
.
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Furthermore, the charging rates rj chosen by each user j
is a collection of independent and identically distributed
discrete random variables each with PMF
pr(r) =

P
(
¯
α1 < αj < α¯
1
)
if r = R1 ,
...
P
(
¯
αL < αj < α¯
L
)
if r = RL .
PROOF. The DSL-FP special case with total cost
functions of the form of (3) arises with F = 0 and
ξj = 0. Simply substituting these values into the general
DSL model implies that the desired charge rate ρj =∞
for all users j. In practice, this means that users arrive
desiring to charge as fast as possible. In return, this
means that Corollary 2 is just the application of the
ρj > R
L case of P (gk = mini gi | ρj) in Proposition 1.
Corollary 2 states that, when a given service level is cho-
sen with nonzero probability, there exists an interval of
impatience factor values for which that service level min-
imizes the total cost to a user. The probability that the
given service level will be chosen is therefore computed
by integrating the distribution of αj on that interval.
This special case is the focus of our previous work [14].
Proposition 1 and Corollary 2 define the probability a
user will choose a particular service level under the DSL
model. As noted, this probability is equivalent to the
probability of choosing a specific charging rate. Since
choosing a charging rate is a discrete choice, an explicit
PMF is available for the rates of charge. This fact will
be used for the main result in the next section.
3.2 High-Confidence Bounds on Resource Usage
To state the high-confidence bounds on the total num-
ber of vehicles at the charging facility along with the
aggregate power consumption, we start by making some
observations about the expected charging rate and ex-
pected deadline for the different models.
In the DSL model E[r] =
∑L
`=1R
`pr(R
`) and E[r2] =∑L
`=1
(
R`
)2
pr(R
`). In the DSL model, computing the
probability a random user chooses a particular service
level is an integration over the distribution of the impa-
tience factor αj ; however, there exists a difference in this
computation between the DSL-MP and DSL-FP mod-
els. Specifically, the choice of charging rate rj chosen by
a user j is only a function of the impatience factor αj
in the DSL-FP model. Thus in the DSL-FP model rj
is independent of xj so that E[x/r] = E[x]E[1/r] is the
expected charging time for each user j. In the DSL-MP
model, there arises a dependency between rj and xj as
a result of the ratio ρj = xj/ξj appearing in the integra-
tion bounds of Proposition 1. Hence, to compute E[x/r]
one has to find the derived distribution of the ratio xj/rj
rather than simply dividing the expectations as is the
case in the DSL-FP model.
In the PD model, the distribution of rj can be found by
finding the derived distribution of the ratio xj/uj and
depends on the distributions of xj and uj . The deadline
uj is also a function of random variables, e.g., (7) in the
case when the pricing function is (6), and hence its dis-
tribution is also a derived distribution from the distri-
butions of αj and xj . Once the distributions of uj and
rj are computed, one can compute E[u], E[r], and E[r2]
for the continuous pricing scheme which are of interest
in the main result of this paper.
Next, we state the main theorem for this paper which
addresses Problem Statement 1 for both the DSL and
PD models.
Theorem 3 Consider a charging facility operating un-
der the DSL model (resp., PD model) with Assumptions
1, 2, and 3 (resp., Assumptions 1, 4, and 5). Let
θ =
{
max {ξ, x/r} if DSL model
u if PD model,
i.e., the model dependent random time spent at the charg-
ing facility for each user, and let
θact =
{
x/r if DSL model
u if PD model,
i.e., the model dependent random time spent actively
charging at the charging facility for each user. Given
any M ≥ 0 number of users and R ≥ 0 total charging
rate, the following statements hold at steady state for any
time t:
(1) With confidence 1− δ(M), where
δ (M) =exp
(
−(M−λE[θ])2
2
(
λE[θ]+ (M−λE[θ])3
)) ifM > λE[θ]
1 otherwise,
the number of users will not exceedM, i.e., P(η(t) <
M) ≥ 1− δ(M).
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(2) With confidence 1− γ(R), where
γ (R) =
min
{
1,
∑⌊ RE[r]⌋
m=
⌈
R
Rmax
⌉ exp( −(R−mE[r])2
2
(
mE[r2]+Rmax(R−mE[r])3
))
×P(η(t) = m)+ δact(⌊ RE[r]⌋)
}
, if R > λE [θact]E [r]
1, otherwise,
and
δact (M) =exp
(
−(M−λE[θact])2
2
(
λE[θact]+ (M−λE[θact])3
)), ifM > λE[θact]
1 otherwise,
the total charging rate for all active users will not
exceed R, i.e., P (Q(t) < R) ≥ 1− γ(R).
Note that δact (M) is very similar to δ (M) in that like
δ (M) it is used for providing a confidence interval onM;
however, note that δact (M) is used for providing con-
fidence on the number of users actively charging rather
than those solely present at the charging facility.
PROOF.
(1) We begin by proving the first statement. First, we
make use of Proposition 4 in Appendix A.2 stating
that for a Poisson random variable Z with mean
λ¯ > 0, and for anyM > λ¯, P(Z <M) ≥ 1−δ†(M)
where
δ†(M) = exp
 − (M− λ¯)2
2
(
λ¯+ M−λ¯3
)
 .
Since the arrival and service process can be seen as
an M/G/∞ queue, η(t) is itself a Poisson random
variable for each t with mean λE[θ] [8, Equation
(9)] and hence letting λ¯ = E[η(t)] = λE[θ] proves
the first case of the statement. For the second case,
observe that if M < λ¯, Proposition 4 cannot be
applied and hence δ(M) = 1 gives a trivial bound
for the sought probability.
(2) Introduce ν as ν = R − ηact(t)E[r]. Hence R =
ηact(t)E[r] + ν. By total probability, it holds that
P
(
Q(t) ≥ R)
=
∞∑
m=0
P
(
Q(t) ≥ R | ηact(t) = m
)
P
(
ηact(t) = m
)
.
(11)
Next we observe that the probability thatQ(t) ≥ R
is zero when m < R/Rmax. This since even if all
users choose the maximum rate, it is impossible
that Q(t) exceeds R, i.e., P(Q(t) ≥ R | ηact(t) =
m
)
= 0 for m < R/Rmax. Using this fact and ex-
panding (11) for some κ > R/Rmax gives
P
(
Q(t) ≥ R) =
κ∑
m=
⌈
R
Rmax
⌉P(Q(t) ≥ R | ηact(t) = m)P(ηact(t) = m)
+
∞∑
m=κ+1
P
(
Q(t) ≥ R | ηact(t) = m
)
P
(
ηact(t) = m
)
.
(12)
For κ < m < ∞, using the fact that P(Q(t) ≥
R | ηact(t) = m
) ≤ 1 and that P(ηact(t) > κ) =∑∞
m=κ+1 P
(
ηact(t) = m
)
, (12) becomes
P
(
Q(t) ≥ R) ≤
κ∑
m=
⌈
R
Rmax
⌉P(Q(t) ≥ R | ηact(t) = m)P(ηact(t) = m)
+ P (ηact(t) > κ) . (13)
For a fixedm, and hence fixed ηact, such that ν ≥ 0,
Fact 5 (Bernstein’s Inequality) in Appendix A.2 can
be utilized with b = Rmax and n = ηact(t), so that
each summation term in (13) is bounded as
P
(
Q(t) ≥ ηact(t)E[r] + ν | ηact(t)
)
≤ exp
(
−ν2
2
(
ηact(t)E[r2] + R
maxν
3
)) .
Note that to apply Bernstein’s inequality, ν ≥ 0,
which is equivalent to R−mE [r] > 0. This implies
m < R/E [r]. Hence, we choose κ = ⌊R/E [r]⌋, i.e.,
the floor value of R/E [r]. Using the above facts,
(13) can be rewritten as
P
(
Q(t) ≥ R)
≤
⌊
R
E[r]
⌋∑
m=
⌈
R
Rmax
⌉ exp
 − (R−mE[r])2
2
(
mE[r2] + R
max(R−mE[r])
3
)

× P(ηact(t) = m)+ P (ηact(t) > ⌊R/E [r]⌋) .
Now, by utilizing the result from Statement 1 of
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Theorem 3, we obtain
P
(
Q(t) ≥ R)
≤
⌊
R
E[r]
⌋∑
m=
⌈
R
Rmax
⌉ exp
 − (R−mE[r])2
2
(
mE[r2] + R
max(R−mE[r])
3
)

× P(ηact(t) = m)+ δact(⌊ RE [r]
⌋)
= γ† (R) .
As a result of Bernstein’s inequality, the bound
γ† (R) is less than 1 for some interval of R ∈
(Γa,∞) where it attains the value of 1 if R ≤ Γa.
To find the exact interval for when γ† (R) = 1
requires finding a specific value of R; however,
we know that Γa must be greater than or equal
to E [ηact(t)]E [r] as a result of using Bernstein’s
inequality on Q(t). Hence,
γ (R) =
{
min
{
1, γ† (R)} R > E [ηact(t)]E [r]
1, otherwise.
Now, recalling from [8, Equation (9)] thatE [ηact(t)] =
λE[θact] and that P (Q(t) < R) = 1 − P
(
Q(t) ≥
R) ≥ 1− γ (R) completes the proof.
Theorem 3 quantifies the likelihood a charging facility
under stochastic user arrivals and charging demand will
stay within (or exceed) a specified threshold of user ca-
pacity and active user rate consumption. Remarkably,
Theorem 3 is applicable to both the discrete and con-
tinuous pricing schemes under their respective assump-
tions.
4 Numerical Studies
In this section, we present two numerical studies: a study
which illustrates the theoretical results of Theorem 3
compared to Monte Carlo simulations, and a study which
shows how a charging facility operator can utilize the
main theorem results to set the charging facility pricing
function parameters for both operational models.
4.1 Monte Carlo Study of Bounds
We first study the DSL model and consider a charg-
ing facility system which broadcasts L = 4 pricing
functions. 3 Satisfying Assumption 1, we suppose uni-
form distributions for the demand x, impatience fac-
tor α, and time spent at the location ξ with support
3 The code for this case study is available at
https://github.com/gtfactslab/automatica_charging_
facility
Table 3
Case Study Parameters for Facility
Model Var. Value/Range Units
Defined L 4 -
Service Level R` 15, 25, 35, 45 kW
V ` 0.20, 0.22, 0.24, 0.26 $/kWh
E[x/r] 1.87 hr.
E[r] 27.68 kW
Prescribed D 2 $/kW-hr3
Deadline B 0.25 $/kWh
ω 4 hr.
E[u] 3.92 hr.
E[r] 12.60 kW
[xmin, xmax] = [10, 100] (kWh), [αmin, αmax] = [0, 10]
($/hr.), and [ξmin, ξmax] = [0, 3.5] ($/hr.), respectively.
Additionally, the arrival rate for the users to the charg-
ing facility is λ = 20 EVs/hr. The parameters of the
random variables for the charging facility pricing func-
tion parameters in this case study are in Table 3.
To illustrate Statement 1 of Theorem 3 relating to the
number of present users at the charging facility η(t), we
conduct a 1000 run Monte Carlo simulation which we use
as a benchmark to illustrate the value of P (η(t) <M).
This is shown in Fig. 2 with error bars that illustrate the
values within two standard deviations of the mean at-
tained across all the Monte Carlo runs at specified prob-
ability levels. Furthermore, we illustrate the theoretical
lower bound on P (η(t) <M), i.e., 1− δ(M), as a func-
tion ofM.
Notice that in Fig. 2 when M = 55, we see that the
results from Theorem 3 indicate that P (η(t) <M) ≥
0.35. where the Monte Carlo indicates P (η(t) <M) is
approximately 0.80. Empirically, we see the theoretical
bound on the number of present users in the charging
facility for the specified service levels provides operators
with the ability to adequately quantify the likelihood
η(t) will exceed some threshold.
Similarly, in this paper, we consider a charging facility
that is required to adhere to total power rate constraints
from all of its actively charging users. For this, we utilize
Statement 2 of Theorem 3. Fig. 3 shows the theoretical
lower bound, i.e., 1− γ(R) on the probability the total
power draw of the active users will exceed some valueR.
The average total power consumption and the two stan-
dard deviation error bars across all Monte Carlo runs
are presented in Fig. 3. Here, we see that the theoreti-
cal bound provides a conservative quantification of the
amount of power draw of the active users in the charg-
ing facility. This bound is more conservative than the
bound on the total number of active users because it is
also dependent on δact (M) from Statement 2 of Theo-
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Fig. 2. DSL model plot of the theoretical bound, i.e.,
1 − δ(M), from Theorem 3 on the total number of present
users in the charging facility versus Monte Carlo results at
various percentiles. The error bars represent the values two
standard deviations away from the mean in a particular per-
centile for all Monte Carlo draws while the curve itself con-
nects the mean of each percentile.
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Fig. 3. DSL model plot of the theoretical bound, i.e., 1−γ(R),
from Theorem 3 on the total rate demanded by actively
charging users versus Monte Carlo results at various per-
centiles. The error bars represent the values two standard
deviations away from the mean in a particular percentile for
all Monte Carlo draws.
rem 3 which is itself not an exact account of the number
of active users in the charging facility.
Next, we consider the PD model and perform an identical
analysis using both statements of Theorem 3. We assume
the pricing function (6) from Example 1 and total cost
function (4) with parameters listed in Table 3. Like in the
DSL model, we conduct a Monte Carlo simulation and
compare the results with the bounds from Theorem 3.
These results are shown in in Fig. 4 and 5.
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Fig. 4. PD model plot of the theoretical bound, i.e., 1−δ(M),
from Theorem 3 on the total number of present users in
the charging facility versus Monte Carlo results at various
percentiles. The error bars represent the values two standard
deviations away from the mean in a particular percentile for
all Monte Carlo draws while the curve itself connects the
mean of each percentile.
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Fig. 5. PD model plot of the theoretical bound, i.e., 1−γ(R),
from Theorem 3 on the total rate demanded by actively
charging users versus Monte Carlo results at various per-
centiles. The error bars represent the values two standard
deviations away from the mean in a particular percentile for
all Monte Carlo draws.
4.2 Resource Aware Pricing
A charging facility operator whose facility operates un-
der the DSL model with total user cost functions as in
(1) and Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 can utilize Theorem 3 to
properly estimate a high-confidence bound on the num-
ber of active users using its facilities and their power con-
sumption and subsequently see the effects on η(t) and
Q(t) resulting from changing the charge rates. To illus-
trate this point we proceed with a numerical example.
For the DSL model, computing the high-confidence
bounds depends on E[x/r], E[r] and E[r2]. As an ex-
ample, consider an EV charging facility operator with
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capacity for 40 simultaneously present vehicles and who
would like to ensure with high probability that a space
is available for each arriving user. Therefore, the facility
operator would like to quantify the likelihood the num-
ber of present users will exceed a specified threshold.
Here, an operator can use Statement 1 from Theorem 3
to get such a bound.
For instance, suppose the operator offers L = 2 ser-
vice levels with R1 = 30, R2 = 40, V 1 = 5.2, and
V 2 = 5.4. Each arriving user chooses a service level ac-
cording to (2). The resulting theoretical bound on the
probability the number of present users is less than M
at the charging facility is illustrated in blue in the upper
plot of Fig. 6. Notice that the theoretical bound predicts
that, for M = 40 active users P (η(t) <M) ≥ 0. This
of course is a trivial bound and hence provides little as-
surance that η(t) will not exceed a value of 40.
If the operator wishes to achieve a higher level of confi-
dence that the facility capacity will not be exceeded, the
operator can increase the charging rates to (R1)+ = 50
and (R2)+ = 70 while maintaining V 1 and V 2 the same.
Notice that the new theoretical bound, 1− δ+M(M), has
increased the confidence that the number of active users
will not exceed 40, i.e., P (η(t) < 40) ≥ 0.75; however,
this occurs at the expense of higher total active user
charging rates. This is seen in the bottom plot of Fig. 6
where 1− γ(R) shifts to the right to become 1− γ+(R)
after the charging rates increase, i.e., there is lower con-
fidence the total active user charging rate will not exceed
a given total charging rate. Hence, a charging facility
operator can use Theorem 3 to adjust the individual ser-
vice level charging rates to manage the number of active
users at the expense of the charging facility total charg-
ing rate. A similar exercise can be conducted for a case
when the facility total charging rate is of concern where
one would decrease the charging rates.
In the PD model we demonstrate a similar phenomenon.
Consider a charging facility operating with a total cost
function as in (4) under Assumptions 1, 4, and 5. We can
use Theorem 3 to achieve a desirable confidence bound
on the number of present users at the charging facility.
For instance, the operator offers a pricing function as
in (6) where D = 2, B = 5, ω = 4, and Rmax = 50 and
where the total cost that users are trying to minimize
is (4). Note that in this model the charging operator deals
with deadlines and hence they will adjust the parameter
ω accordingly. The resulting theoretical bound on the
number of active users for various confidence bounds is
illustrated in green in the upper plot of Fig. 7. Notice
that the theoretical bound predicts that, for M = 80
active users P (η(t) < 80) ≥ 0. This is a trivial bound
and hence provides little confidence that η(t) will not
exceed a value of 80.
Hence, to achieve a higher level of confidence that η(t)
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Fig. 6. We illustrate the change in the theoretical bounds re-
sulting from an operator increasing the vehicle charge rates
in the charging facility in the DSL model. The top plot
illustrates the theoretical bound on the number of users,
1 − δ(M), in the charging facility with a baseline charging
rate compared to the bound after increasing the charging
rates, 1− δ+(M). Here, we see that after the charging facil-
ity increases the vehicle charging rates there is higher con-
fidence, at a lower level of present users, that the number
of present users will be less thanM; however, this comes at
the cost of a higher total charge rate at the charging facility.
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Fig. 7. We illustrate the change in the theoretical bounds re-
sulting from an operator decreasing ω at the charging facil-
ity in the PD model. The top plot illustrates the theoretical
bound on the number of present users, i.e. 1− δ(M), in the
charging facility with a baseline ω compared to the bound
after decreasing ω, 1 − δ−(M). Note that after the charg-
ing facility decreased ω there is higher confidence, at lower
levels of present users, that the number of present users will
be less than M; however, this comes at the cost of a higher
total charge rate at the charging facility.
will be less than 80, a charging operator can adjust ω
to (ω)− = 2.5. Notice in Fig. 7 that the new theoret-
ical bound, 1 − δ−M(M), has increased the confidence
that the number of active users will not exceed 80, i.e.,
P (η(t) < 80) ≥ .95; however, this occurs at a slight ex-
pense of higher total active user charging rates. A simi-
lar exercise can be conducted for a case when the facility
total charging rate is of concern where a charging facility
operator would increase ω.
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5 Conclusion
We study the problem of providing probabilistic bounds
on an EV charging facility’s likelihood of exceeding a
specified number of present users and the total active
user power draw. Specifically, we focus on charging fa-
cilities which can deploy either a defined service level
(DSL) model, i.e., where users choose from finitely many
charging rates, or a prescribed deadline (PD) model, i.e.,
where users choose a charging deadline. In both models,
we leverage knowledge on the probability distributions
of the user parameters to provide probabilistic guaran-
tees. We illustrate these derived probabilistic bounds in
a case study and ultimately demonstrate how a charging
facility operator can utilize these results to set charging
facility parameters in order to achieve desired behavior.
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A Proofs and Additional Propositions
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
PROOF. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, consider the
set of L pricing functions
{
g`(xj , αj , ξj)
}L
`=1
of the form
g`(xj , αj , ξj) = xjV
` +αj
[ xj
R`
− ξj
]
+
+F
[
ξj − xjR`
]
+
as
specified in (1). From (2), and the law of total probabil-
ity, we have that
P(S(xj , αj , ξj) = k) =
∫
ρj
P
(
gk = min
i
gi | ρj
)
fP(ρj) dP
= EP
[
P
(
gk = min
i
gi | ρj
)]
,
where we recall the random variable ρj = xj/ξj , and, for
convenience, we sometimes omit the arguments of the
pricing functions. In the remainder of the proof, we es-
tablish closed form expressions for P
(
gk = mini gi | ρj
)
by considering the cases corresponding to the interval
partitions introduced in Section 3.1, namely, the inter-
vals ρj < R
1, ρj ∈ [Rm, Rm+1) for m ∈ [1, . . . , L − 1],
and RL < ρj .
For future use, define ∆ki V = V
k − V i and ∆ki R¯ =
R¯k − R¯i = 1/Ri − 1/Rk for all i, k. Through-
out the proof, we will use the observation that
gk(xj , αj , ξj) = mini gi(xj , αj , ξj) if and only if
gk(xj , αj , ξj) ≤ gi(xj , αj , ξj) for all i.
Case 1: ρj < R
1
When ρj < R
1 this implies that ρj is less than all charg-
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ing rates as a result of the ordering of the service lev-
els, and as a result with k = 1 we get g1(xj , αj , ξj) −
gi(xj , αj , ξj) = xj(∆
1
iV −F∆1i R¯). Note that due to the
ordering delineated in Assumption 2, this quantity is al-
ways less than zero since ∆1iV < 0, ∆
1
i R¯ > 0, F > 0,
and xj > 0. For any other choice of k ∈ {2, . . . , L}, there
exists i 6= k such that gk(xj , αj , ξj) − gi(xj , αj , ξj) =
xj(∆
k
i V − F∆ki R¯) > 0, and hence such a choice of k
can not be the minimum. Hence, we obtain the condi-
tional probability in the case when ρj < R
1 that P(gk =
mini gi | ρj) = 1 if k = 1 and P(gk = mini gi | ρj) = 0 if
k 6= 1.
Case 2: ρj ∈ [Rm,Rm+1)
First, consider the case when the minimizing index k ≤
m for some m ∈ {1, . . . , L− 1}. Then
gk(xj , αj , ξj)− gi(xj , αj , ξj) =
xj∆
k
i V+αj
(
xj
Rk
− ξj −
[ xj
Ri
− ξj
]
+
)
−F
([
ξj − xj
Ri
]
+
)
.
Hence, we consider several cases for i. When i < k,
gk(xj , αj , ξj)− gi(xj , αj , ξj) = xj(∆ki V + αj∆ki R¯). No-
tice that, since xj > 0, the sign of this difference depends
only on the random variable αj . Since k is assumed to
be the minimizing index, this difference must be non-
positive for all i. Rearranging, we see that gk being the
minimizer for some k ≤ m implies αj > (∆ikV )/(∆ki R¯)
for all i < k ≤ m.
Similarly, for k < i ≤ m, the difference gk(xj , αj , ξj) −
gi(xj , αj , ξj) = xj(∆
k
i V + αj∆
k
i R¯). This difference is
negative when αj < (∆
i
kV )/(∆
k
i R¯). Lastly, when m +
1 ≤ i,
gk(xj , αj , ξj)− gi(xj , αj , ξj) =
xj∆
k
i V + αj
( xj
Rk
− ξj
)
− F
(
ξj − xj
Ri
)
.
Similarly as before, after algebraic manipulation this
quantity is negative when
αj <
F
(
1
ρj
− 1Ri
)
−∆ki V
1
Rk
− 1ρj
.
Combining the above inequalities on αj , and defining
fA(αj) to be the probability distribution of αj , this es-
tablishes that, when ρj ∈ [Rm, Rm+1) and k ≤ m,
P
(
gk = min
i
gi | ρj
)
=
[∫ α¯k1
¯
αk1
fA(αj) dA
]
+
= P
(
¯
αk1 < αj < α¯
k
1
)
,
where α¯k1 and ¯
αk1 are as defined in the statement of
Proposition 1. Now consider the case when k = m + 1.
Then
gk(xj , αj , ξj)− gi(xj , αj , ξj) =
xj∆
k
i V−αj
[ xj
Ri
− ξj
]
+
+F
(
ξj − xj
Rk
−
[
ξj − xj
Ri
]
+
)
.
for all i. Consider first the case when i < m + 1. Then
the difference becomes
gk(xj , αj , ξj)− gi(xj , αj , ξj) =
xj∆
k
i V − αj
( xj
Ri
− ξj
)
+ F
(
ξj − xj
Rk
)
,
which is negative when
αj >
F
(
1
Rk
− 1ρj
)
−∆ki V
1
ρj
− 1Ri
.
Similarly, still considering the case where k = m + 1,
when m+ 1 < i, the difference becomes gk(xj , αj , ξj)−
gi(xj , αj , ξj) = xj
(
∆ki V − F∆ki R¯
)
, which is always neg-
ative when i > m + 1. Hence, when ρj ∈ [Rm, Rm+1)
and k = m+ 1, the quantity
P
(
gk = min
i
gi | ρj
)
=
[∫ αmax
¯
αk2
fA(αj) dA
]
+
= P
(
¯
αk2 < αj < αmax
)
,
where
¯
αk2 is as defined in the statement of Proposition 1.
Lastly, consider the case when k > m+ 1. For some i ≥
m+1, gk(xj , αj , ξj)−gi(xj , αj , ξj) = ∆ki V −F∆ki R¯ > 0,
and thus k cannot be the minimizing index. As a result,
we have that if ρj ∈ [Rm, Rm+1) and k > m+ 1, P(gk =
mini gi | ρj) = 0.
Case 3: RL < ρj
When RL < ρj this implies that ρj is greater than all
charging rates as a result of the ordering of the ser-
vice levels. Moreover, for all k and i, gk(xj , αj , ξj) −
gi(xj , αj , ξj) = xj(∆
k
i V +αj∆
k
i R¯). Again, since xj > 0,
the sign of this difference depends only on the random
variable αj . In particular, the difference is negative when
αj < (∆
i
kV )/(∆
k
i R¯). Combining these inequalities for
all i, It follows that when RL < ρj ,
P(gk = min
i
gi | ρj) =
[∫ α¯k3
¯
αk3
fA {αj} dA
]
+
= P
(
¯
αk3 < αj < α¯
k
3
)
,
where α¯k3 and ¯
αk3 are as defined in the statement of
Proposition 1. This completes the proof.
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A.2 Proposition 4
Proposition 4 LetZ be a Poisson random variable with
mean λ¯. Then, for anyM > λ¯ > 0, it holds that P(Z <
M) ≥ 1− δ(M), where
δ(M) = exp
 − (M− λ¯)2
2
(
λ¯+ M−λ¯3
)
 .
Before proving Proposition 4, we recall Bernstein’s in-
equality which gives a probabilistic upper bound on the
sum of the deviation from the mean of a bounded random
variable which is the basis for the proof of the proposi-
tion.
Fact 5 (Bernstein’s Inequality, [16]) Given n inde-
pendent, zero-mean random variables Xi such that, for
some b > 0, ν > 0, 0 ≤ Xi ≤ b almost surely for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then, it holds that
P
(
n∑
i=1
(Xi − E[Xi]
) ≥ ν)
≤ exp
(
−ν2
2
(∑n
i=1 E[X2i ] +
bν
3
)) .
We will now apply the Fact 5 to prove Proposition 4.
PROOF. [Proof of Proposition 4.] We seek to prove a
bound on the likelihood a Poisson RV will exceed some
valueM. Recall from the Poisson limit theorem [3, The-
orem 3.6.1] that a Poisson RV Z with mean λ¯ can be
seen as a sum of n Bernoulli RVs Xi ≤ 1 with mean p,
where p is such that np → λ¯ when n → +∞. In other
words,
∑n
i=1Xi → Z as n→ +∞. Here, we see that we
can now apply Fact 5 to find a bound on the value of a
Poisson random variable which is approximated as the
sum of Bernoulli RVs.
Let X =
∑n
i=1Xi and E[X] = E [
∑n
i=1Xi] =∑n
i=1 E [Xi] = np. Since Fact 5 applies to zero-
mean random variables, let X0 = X − E[X] =∑n
i=1Xi−
∑n
i=1 E [Xi] be a zero-mean sum of Bernoulli
random variables where E[X0] = 0. Then, applying
Fact 5 with b = 1 and lettingM = ν + E [X] = ν + np,
P
(
X0 ≥ ν) = P( n∑
i=1
Xi −
n∑
i=1
E [Xi] ≥ ν
)
= P (X − E[X] ≥ ν) = P (X ≥ ν + E[X])
= P (X ≥M) ≤ exp
 − (M− np)2
2
(
np+ M−np3
)
 .
The last inequality uses the fact that
∑n
i=1 E
[
X2i
]
= np.
Since we can approximate a Poisson random variable Z
via the Poisson limit theorem, by letting n → +∞, we
get
P (Z ≥M) ≤ exp
 − (M− λ¯)2
2
(
λ¯+ M−λ¯3
)
 .
This proves the proposition.
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